Why Was Lochner Wrong?
David A. Strausst
Lochner v New York' would probably win the prize, if there were

one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred years.
Lochner does have capable defenders who make arguments that must

be taken seriously.! And Lochner would have some competition for

the prize; Korematsu v United States,' in particular, would be a strong

contender. But judged by some rough-and-ready indicators-Would
you ever cite this case in a Supreme Court brief, except to identify it
with your opponents' position? If a judicial nominee avowed support
for this case in a Senate confirmation hearing, would that immediately
put an end to her chances?-Lochner is one of the great antiprecedents of the twentieth century. You have to reject Lochner if you

want to be in the mainstream of American constitutional law today.
Lochner,which declared unconstitutional a New York maximumhours statute for bakers, is, of course, more than just a case. It symbolizes the era in which the Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and regulatory measures, including minimum wage
laws,' laws designed to enable employees to unionize, and a federal
statute establishing a pension system for railway workers.6 The
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Lochner-eradecisions were ferociously attacked, and the Court's 1937

7
decision in West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish marked the end of the

Lochner era. By the early 1940s, Lochner's status as a pariah was secure.
The striking thing about the disapproval of Lochner, though, is
that there is no consensus on why it is wrong. If you ask people why
the Supreme Court was right to strike down racial segregation or uphold the right of speakers to criticize the government, their answers
are likely to agree in broad outline. But the parallel question about
Lochner will produce widely differing responses. Was Lochner wrong
because it enforced a right-"the right of contract between the employer and employrs" 9- that is not expressed in or fairly inferred from
the text of the Constitution? Or was it wrong because freedom of contract, although having plausible constitutional status, does not have
sufficient weight to override legislation that addresses urgent social
needs? Is the problem that freedom of contract, while a perfectly good
right in the abstract, should not be enforced by the courts but is instead something legislatures alone should take into account? Or is the
problem a more general one, that the Supreme Court treated the
rights defined by the common law of contracts as constituting a natural, "pre-political" state of affairs, and refused to recognize that those
rights are as much the product of state action as the regulatory statutes the Court was invalidating? All of these accounts, and others,
have been offered, and it seems fair to say that none of them has
gained a consensus.10

Why is there no consensus? Much of the reason is that widelyaccepted developments in constitutional law since the demise of
Lochner are subject to the same criticisms that have been directed at
Lochner.The puzzle, for anyone who generally accepts the way constitutional law has evolved over the last half century or so, is to find an
argument against Lochner that would not undermine those developments as well. That is the question I will discuss in this Essay: How can
Lochner, which today is the epitome of an out-of-the-mainstream de7

300 US 379 (1937).
There are many accounts of the demise of Lochner. See, for example, Barry Cushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court (Oxford 1998).
9 Lochner, 198 US at 53.
10 For accounts of the various objections to Lochner, see, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone,
et al, ConstitutionalLaw 718-23 (Aspen 4th ed 2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther,
Constitutional Law 463-66 (Foundation 14th ed 2001). For the specific objections mentioned in
the text, see, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica 44-46,49 (Free Press 1990);
Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 574-78 (Foundation 2d ed 1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873 (1987); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust.A
Theory of Judicial Review 18 (Harvard 1980); Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv L Rev 431 (1926).
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cision, be criticized in a way that is consistent with today's mainstream
constitutional law?
Three widely-accepted developments in recent decades, in particular, are inconsistent with the traditional criticisms of Lochner.
First, for a half-century the Supreme Court has enforced fundamental
rights, sometimes in the face of significant popular opposition, in a
way that few people could have foreseen when Lochner was interred
by the New Deal Court. Second, it has become generally accepted (or
so I will argue) that the courts can properly recognize constitutional
rights that are not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution.
The third development, not confined to constitutional law, is an enhanced understanding of both the virtues and the limitations of freedom of contract and economic markets-an understanding that validates the Lochner-era Court's concern with freedom of contract but
impugns many of the specific decisions that Court made as it enforced
the right.
My conclusion, in a word, is that the Lochner-era Court acted defensibly in recognizing freedom of contract but indefensibly in exalting it. Freedom of contract, judged by the standards that developed in
the last half of the twentieth century, is a plausible constitutional right.
It might merit careful, case-by-case enforcement, undertaken with
sensitivity to the limitations of the right as well as its value. The
Lochner-era Court went far beyond that. It treated freedom of contract as a cornerstone of the constitutional order and systematically
undervalued reasons for limiting or overriding the right. It is one thing
to enforce freedom of contract in a limited and qualified way; it is
quite another to make freedom of contract a preeminent constitutional value that repeatedly prevails over legislation that, in the eyes
of elected representatives, serves important social purposes. Seen from
the end of the twentieth century, the Lochner Court's error -one that
may have enduring lessons for the Supreme Court as an institutionwas that it did the latter rather than the former.
I. THE SUCCESS OF JUDICIAL ACrIVISM

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, when Lochner was dispatched,
many people thought that the courts were simply going to get out of
the business of systematically enforcing constitutional rights against
legislative majorities. The courts might act against legislation that was
especially poorly conceived, or they might invalidate particularly severe abuses. But "the influential and ultimately decisive criticism of
the Court in this period" was that the Court should confine itself to
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striking down laws that were in some sense irrational." This view, associated with James Bradley Thayer, influenced Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, the most famous dissenters from the Lochner-era rulings; it
is reflected in Holmes's Lochner dissent. 2 Justice Frankfurter, perhaps
the New Deal's leading intellectual opponent of the Lochner Court,
based his judicial career on this creed, most notably in his opinion dissenting from the Court's invalidation of a mandatory flag salute law in
West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette." As late as 1958,

Judge Learned Hand vigorously reasserted the same position."
It is easy to see why people drew this lesson from the demise of
Lochner. During the Lochner era, the only constitutional principles
that the Supreme Court enforced regularly and systematically were
those that the New Deal discredited: freedom of contract, as in
Lochner, and federalism-based limits on Congress's power. During
that time, the Supreme Court invalidated a few laws on the ground
that they violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech,
but only a few;" First Amendment principles that are familiar today
were barely nascent, and in the late 1930s the Court was only a decade
removed from decisions that essentially allowed the government to
punish political dissent. 6The Court struck down a few egregious violations of the Due Process Clause, and even some racially discriminatory government acts, but these decisions too were episodic, not systematic.'? It would have been quite plausible to think that one lesson
of the Lochner era was that judicial review is unacceptable unless it is
confined to exceptional cases of governmental irrationality or malfeasance. The project of identifying and elaborating constitutional rights,
and systematically protecting them against legislative interference,
was, one might have thought, precisely what courts should not do.
One of the signal developments in the last half-century of American constitutional law has been the Supreme Court's persistent will11 Alexander

M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 46 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 144 (1893) (asserting that the Court may declare a law unconstitutional only "when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but
have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question"). See Lochner, 198
US at 75-76 (Holmes dissenting).
13 319 US 624,647 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting). See also id at 666 ("I know of no other
test which this Court is authorized to apply in nullifying legislation" than "the absence of a rational justification for the legislation.").
14 See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 66-67,71-77 (Harvard 3d ed 1960).
15 See, for example, Near v Minnesota,283 US 697 (1931); Stromberg v California,283 US
359 (1931); Fiske v Kansas,274 US 380,387 (1927).
16 See, for example, Whitney v California,274 US 357,371 (1927); Gitlow v New York, 268
US 652,667 (1925).
17 See, for example, Norris v Alabama, 294 US 587 (1935); Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45,71
(1932); Moore v Dempsey, 261 US 86,91-92 (1923).
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ingness to undertake that very project. Since around the mid-1950s,
the Court has regularly enforced constitutional rights, and regularly
declared laws unconstitutional, including laws that had substantial
popular support. During that time, many justices have sat on the
Court, of course, with different methodological and political commitments. Some have been politically liberal, some conservative; some
said they based their decisions on the text of the Constitution and the
original understanding alone, while others have drawn on a wider
range of sources in interpreting the Constitution. Different majorities
have vindicated different constitutional rights and principles: The
Warren Court was particularly solicitous of racial minorities; the current Court has revived limits on Congress's power. But throughout
this period, one constant has been the rejection of the Thayer view, arguably by every Justice except Frankfurter (and even Frankfurter was
not steadfast by any means). The Court has not limited itself to measures that no rational person could defend; it has consistently asserted
a much more prominent role for itself.
The First Amendment is a particularly clear example. The Supreme Court, and the lower courts, regularly invalidate legislation and
other official action, including quite important and popular legislation,
on First Amendment grounds." The Court does not claim that these
laws are irrational; it explicitly applies a higher standard of review. 9To
oversimplify, the Court has, for several decades now, done with freedom of speech something comparable to what it tried to do with freedom of contract in the Lochner era. While there are dissents in particular First Amendment cases, no Justice -and seemingly hardly anyone outside of academia-suggests that it is improper for the courts to
see themselves as the special guardians of freedom of expression.
There are other instances in which the courts have enforced constitutional limits, consistently over an extended period, in a way that cannot be squared with the Thayer approach: criminal procedure, religious establishment and free exercise, gender discrimination, affirmative action, and, in the last few years, limits on Congress's powers.
Moreover, the Court has, with some consistency, been willing to
do things that were quite unpopular with at least some segments of
society. The Warren Court was famous for doing this, of course, in its
decisions on race, school prayer, and criminal procedure. The Burger
Court decided Roe v Wade;'° the Rehnquist Court held that the First

18 See, for example, Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition, 122 S Ct 1389,
1405-06 (2002);
Reno vACLU, 521 US 844,849 (1997).
19 See, for example, Free Speech Coalition, 122 S Ct at 1396; Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc v FCC, 520 US 180,185 (1997) (applying "intermediate First Amendment scrutiny").
20 410 US 113,154 (1973).
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Amendment protected flag-burning,2 and several of its decisions limiting Congress's power invalidated laws adopted by substantial legislative majorities." This is not to say that it is commendable for courts to
thwart the legislature in this way; some of these decisions seem to me
severely misguided. Also, one must be careful not to overstate the unpopularity of the courts' actions. Even when the Supreme Court did
things that aroused substantial opposition, it was generally supported
by important segments of either popular or elite opinion. But the willingness and ability of courts to take an aggressive role in enforcing
constitutional rights has become an entrenched aspect of the legal culture in a way that few could have anticipated when Lochner was interred.
The upshot of this development is that, for anyone who generally
accepts the role that the Supreme Court plays today, the argument
that Lochner is wrong cannot draw-as it did during the New Dealon a general skepticism about the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial
review. Lochner's critics cannot rely on a background understanding
that judicial review is an aberrant and insecure institution in a democracy, and that courts must confine their actions narrowly if they do not
want to risk losing their legitimacy. Some justices still profess that attitude toward judicial review, but it is effectively belied by several decades of consensus in favor of much greater activism. The Thayer view
has received powerful academic defenses recently, but today anyone
holding that view would have to reject a great deal of constitutional
law. Today, the attack on Lochner has to acknowledge that a judicial
practice that has important similarities to Lochner--the systematic judicial elaboration of constitutional rights, in the face of a significant
degree of popular opposition--has been accepted by, in fact celebrated by, mainstream legal thought. If Lochner is outside the mainstream, which it is, it must be for some other reason.
II.

UNENUMERATED RIGHTS

A second criticism of Lochner-quite different from the view

identified with Thayer-was that the Court erred in Lochner not by
enforcing constitutional rights, but by enforcing a right not found in
the Constitution. Freedom of contract, unlike freedom of speech, for
example, is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution. Its textual
See United States v Eichman, 496 US 310,318 (1990); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397,406,
412 (1989).
See, for example, Kimel v FloridaBoard of Regents, 528 US 62,91 (2000); City of Boerne
22
v Flores, 521 US 507,511 (1997).
23 See Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the ConstitutionAway From the Courts 154-76 (Princeton
1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement211-31 (Oxford 1999); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial
Review and InstitutionalChoice, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev 1557 (2002).
21
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basis was the oxymoronic notion of "substantive due process." There is
no problem, on this account, when courts enforce rights that are in the
Constitution; the problem arises when they enforce rights that they
have just made up themselves.
This attack on Lochner appears in Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion in West Coast Hotel Co:4 "What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.""n But the most important proponent of this view was Justice Hugo Black. Black and Frankfurter were the two most influential appointees of President Franklin
Roosevelt, and both were sworn opponents of Lochner, but they derived sharply differing lessons from Lochner's failure. Their disagreement dominated constitutional law for many years. Between the two,
it seems fair to say that Black has prevailed in a rout. Black's principal
campaign, to apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states,
has essentially succeeded; Frankfurter's judicial abstinence is nowhere
to be found on the Court today.
Perhaps as a result, the criticism of Lochner that is associated
with Black has been enormously and persistently influential. It was
the basis of what is still perhaps the most prominent criticism of Roe:
that the right to reproductive choice is simply not found in the Constitution. 6 This same account of the vice of Lochner was echoed as late
as 1986, almost 50 years after the end of the Lochner era, in Justice
Byron White's opinion for the Court in Bowers v Hardwick:7
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
That this is so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's, which resulted
in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court
had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.But this view -that the courts should confine themselves to rights
that are in some sense explicit in the text of the Constitution-has
also not prevailed. Roe, of course, has withstood many attacks and has
been reaffirmed. But even the controversy over Roe gives a mislead24

300 US at 379,398-99.

25 Idat391.

26
See, for example, Bork, Tempting of America at 112-16 (cited in note 10); Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 15 (cited in note 10); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf'A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L J 920,943 (1973).
27 478 US 186 (1986).
28 Id at 194-95.
29
See, for example, Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav Casey, 505 US 833,
869 (1992).
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ingly favorable impression of the status of Black's literalism. There
were other things about Roe that many people found objectionable, in
particular, Roe's account of why the state's interest in protecting fetal
life was not sufficient to sustain laws restricting abortion. The argument that the right to abortion is not in the Constitution was surely,
for many people, just a means of attacking a decision that was objectionable mostly because of its treatment of fetal life. The rhetoric was
available because of the supposed lesson of the Lochner era, but the
deeper objection lay elsewhere.
The view that the Court should refuse to recognize "unenumerated" constitutional rights has, in fact, never been accepted by a
°
majority of the Court. Griswold v Connecticu struck down a law
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples on the basis
of an unenumerated right to privacy, over a vigorous dissent by Black
that explicitly accused the majority of doing what the Lochner Court
had done. 1 That decision now appears to have become thoroughly accepted. Griswold and subsequent cases relied on two Lochner-era
3
precedents, Meyer v Nebraska2 and Pierce v Society of Sisters; the

Court reconceptualized these decisions as cases about a family's (unenumerated) right to autonomy, instead of freedom of contract.
In its cases dealing with the "right to die," a majority of the Court
has carefully refrained from endorsing the view that unenumerated
rights should not be recognized' In fact, a majority of the Court
showed a willingness to engage in a careful inquiry into what unenumerated rights should be enforced.3 1 In a number of lesser-known
cases, the Court has seemed quite untroubled by the prospect of recognizing unenumerated rights." It has gone about determining the
contours of substantive rights that had no clear textual basis, without
even entertaining the possibility that such rights should not be recognized at all.
Today, therefore, it seems fair to say that the attack on Lochner as
"outside the mainstream" cannot rely on the argument that freedom
of contract is not enumerated in the Constitution, any more than it
can rely on a general skepticism about judicial review. This is not to
say that the view associated with Justice Black has been decisively refuted, any more than one can say that about the Thayer view. But it is

381 US 479 (1965).
See id at 514-15,523-24.
262 US 390 (1923).
33 268 US 510 (1925).
34 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702,727 (1997); Cruzan v Missouri Department of
Health, 497 US 261,278-79 (1990).
See Glucksberg, 521 US at 720-21; Cruzan, 497 US at 278-79.
35
36 See, for example, Washington v Harper,494 US 210,221-22 (1990).
30
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to say that Lochner's status as a case that defines what it is to be outside the mainstream cannot rely on Black's kind of literalism.
III. FREEDOM OF CONTRACr

If the rejection of Lochner cannot rest on the proposition that
courts should not systematically enforce constitutional rights, including unenumerated rights, then there must be something problematic
about the particular right that Lochner enforced. This, too, was a
prominent line of criticism of Lochner. It can take several forms. One
argument was that while some unenumerated rights can legitimately
be enforced by the courts, freedom of contract lacks any constitutional
roots. Another argument was that freedom of contract is simply not a
valuable enough right: It is, on some accounts, merely a property right,
not a personal right like freedom of speech.
These arguments, too, are much less compelling now than they
might have been in the New Deal era. Freedom of contract-at least
the freedom to contract to work at a particular job-turns out to be a
plausible candidate for protection as a constitutional right. The origins
of Lochner-eraconstitutional law have been traced to the ideology of
the antislavery movement-which, for obvious reasons, emphasized
the importance of allowing all individuals to sell their own labor on
the terms that they saw fit-and, even earlier, to Jacksonian opposition to "class legislation."37 In these ways, freedom of contract was not
merely a fabrication of a business-oriented Supreme Court in the
early twentieth century; there are plausible historical reasons for viewing freedom of contract as part of the liberty protected from substantive limitation by the Due Process Clause, or as one of the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States. Normatively, too, it is
hard to dispute the importance of freedom of contract in some settings. A law that precludes a person from working at a particular occupation can be terribly burdensome-a serious material burden, an
affront to the individual's autonomy, and something that significantly
affects the quality of a person's life.
There is also, today, a more prevalent understanding of the value
of freedom of contract to society as a whole than there was at the time
37
See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged 6, 212 n 25 (Duke 1993); William E.
Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis L Rev
767,800; Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of Liberty of ContractReconsidered: Major Premises in
the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 S Ct Hist Socy Yearbook 20, 27; David M. Gold, Redfield, Railroads,and the Roots of "Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism",27 Am J Legal Hist 254,265
(1983); Eric Foner, Abolitionism and the Labor Movement in Antebellum America, in Politics and
Ideology in the Age of the Civil War 57,64-65 (Oxford 1980); William E. Nelson, The Impact of
the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth-Century America, 87
Harv L Rev 513,557 (1974).
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Lochner was overturned. Today there is a widespread consensus on
the basic importance of market mechanisms, suitably regulated. During the New Deal, the consensus was not as clear. Some prominent
figures at the time thought that significant elements of the economy
should be centrally planned, and the Lochner emphasis on the importance of free markets in labor may have seemed obsolete then. Today
the centrality and importance of free markets is more widely recognized.
What, then, was wrong with the courts' enforcing freedom of contract in the way the Lochner-era courts did? The right is valuable to
individuals and to society; it has plausible constitutional roots; and
neither the lack of an explicit reference in the text of the Constitution,
nor the fact that the right would be enforced by courts against democratic majorities, are insuperable obstacles. Part of the problem-as has
been powerfully argued-may lie in the Lochner Court's unwillingness to recognize that a market ordering governed by freedom of contract is not a natural, pre-political state of affairs, but is as much a
choice of government policy as any regulatory scheme." But that argument, which captures something important about the Lochner
Court's intellectual outlook, only gets us part of the way to an account
of why Lochner was wrong. A defender of the Lochner Court might
acknowledge that enforcing freedom of contract was not "natural" at
all but was a deliberate, conscious policy choice-and then plausibly
insist that it was a good choice, a better choice than restrictions on
freedom of contract, from the point of view of both constitutional legitimacy and moral desirability.
We can get a better sense of the real problem with Lochner by
comparing it to some of the Supreme Court's twentieth-century success stories, that is, to lines of doctrine that have been accepted by the
legal culture and society at large even though they invalidated significant amounts of legislation and other government action. Why have
the Court's decisions enforcing First Amendment rights, for example,
become so thoroughly mainstream? Part of the answer seems to be
that the courts have developed legal principles that reflect both the
value of free expression and the legitimate limits that can be placed
on free expression.
This did not happen easily, or overnight. Some early First
Amendment decisions, for example, suggested that no restrictions on
speech could be upheld unless they were needed to prevent a "clear

38 See Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 1358-59 (Foundation 3d ed
2000); William E. Leuchtenburg, FranklinD. Roosevelt and the New Deal22,30,33-35 (Harper &
Row 1963).
39 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 882 (cited in note 10).
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and present danger" of a serious harm.i If that approach had been
rigorously applied, it would have produced a state of affairs at least as
intolerable as that produced during the Lochner era. It might have
drawn into question many sensible and necessary laws regulating the
time and place of demonstrations, restricting the speech of government employees, compensating people for defamation, and so on. Instead, the courts have developed an elaborate doctrinal structure designed to protect the core values of free speech while allowing the
government greater latitude where those values are not threatened or
when they can be legitimately overridden.
This is the kind of thing the Lochner-eraSupreme Court failed to
do. The problem was not that that Court protected freedom of contract in a wholly indiscriminate way; its doctrine was complex, and it
rejected challenges to economic regulation as often as it sustained
them.4' But the Court lacked an understanding of freedom of contract
that might have enabled it to develop a plausible legal regime.
Freedom of contract is valuable for essentially two reasons. First,
when parties freely agree to do something, there is a presumption that
the agreement reflects a choice that benefits both of them. To the extent that is true, then interfering with freedom of contract gratuitously
reduces well being, unless a third party is somehow affected. Second, a
restriction on freedom of contract may be inconsistent with autonomy;
it denies people the right to control an important aspect of their lives.4
Sometimes one or both of these conditions will not hold. The obvious cases - recognized of course by the Lochner Court - are cases of
incapacity (as with children) or coercion. Incapacity undermines the
premise, necessary to sustaining the argument for freedom of contract,
that an individual's choices reflect his or her own best interests. Coercion does the same. Equally obviously, when an agreement has harmful externalities -effects on a third party-those effects can justify a
restriction on freedom of contract. The Lochner-era Court of course
recognized this, too, in principle.43
A properly formulated conception of freedom of contract, however, must go beyond these basics. Incapacity can take a variety of
forms beyond the obvious cases of infancy and mental disability. An
individual might lack the information needed to make a choice, or-

40 See Terminiello v Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949); Bridges v California,314 US 252, 263
(1941); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296,308 (1940); Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88,104-05
(1940); Schneider v State, 308 US 147, 160-61 (1939).
41 See Wright, The Growth of American ConstitutionalLaw ch 8 (cited in note 6).
42 See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract ch 1 (Harvard 1993).
43
See, for example, McLean v Arkansas, 211 US 539, 547-48 (1909); Muller v Oregon, 208
US 412,421 (1908).
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more significantly, because raw information could, in theory, just be
provided -individuals' rationality in making certain choices might be
bounded. In such circumstances, a restriction on freedom of contract
might benefit a party. Monopoly power in a market, such as a labor
market, undermines the autonomy justification for freedom of contract and, importantly, can have distributive consequences that might
be rectified by a restriction on freedom of contract. Information
asymmetries may lead to agreements that are not mutually beneficial
and that restrictions on freedom of contract might improve. The category of harmful externalities is potentially quite large; psychic effects
and effects on people's status can be real harms, and significant restrictions on freedom of contract may be needed to prevent them. Individuals' preferences might be questioned in some ways, such as
when they have adapted their desires to unjust circumstances and
stopped seeking something that was wrongfully denied to them. In
some circumstances, even the very idea of an exchange might seem inappropriate, as with the sale of sex, or of children."
This is only a superficial sketch of the kinds of concerns that
might justify restricting freedom of contract. Each, of course, presents
complexities. The result is that, in many instances, it will be unclear
whether a particular prohibition on certain kinds of contracts is inconsistent with the core values of freedom of contract. Occupational
health and safety laws, the category to which Lochner arguably belongs, might be upheld (or might not) on the ground that information
failures and bounded rationality prevent employees from accurately
assessing the risks they run. Minimum wage laws, as well as other limits on the employment relationship, might be a way of dealing with
markets in which employers have monopoly power; the laws have the
same effect as a labor union, reducing competition among employees
so that a bilateral monopoly is created, with distributive effects that
benefit the employees. Anti-discrimination laws did not exist during
the Lochner era but would certainly be challenged as abridgments of
freedom of contract today if Lochner survived. They might be justified on the ground that discrimination inflicts a kind of externality on
all members of the victim group whose status is adversely affected;
they might also be justified, sometimes, as dealing with a problem of
asymmetric information. (In a freedom of contract regime, an employee might refuse to seek protection against certain kinds of discriminatory conduct-sexual harassment, for example-because she

fears the employer will label her a troublemaker. As a result, the par44 See generally Trebilcock, Limits of Freedom of Contract (cited in note 42); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With PrivatePreferences,53 U Chi L Rev 1129 (1986).
45 See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds:The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 99 (Harvard 1992).
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ties might not reach mutually beneficial agreements.) In some circumstances, notably when the civil rights laws were first passed, there were
serious problems of coercion, often in the form of social and extralegal sanctions that kept employers and employees from contracting
freely. In these circumstances the civil rights laws actually enhanced
freedom of contract.In addition, freedom of contract need not be treated as inviolable.
Minimum wage legislation-consistently disapproved by the Lochnerera Court-provides an example. On standard economic assumptions,
minimum wage laws increase unemployment; an employer who would
have hired, at a low wage, an employee whose productivity was very
low, will find it unprofitable to hire that employee at the mandated
minimum wage. In that way, minimum wage laws may harm people at
the very bottom of the ladder in order to benefit those a few rungs
above them.
It is not clear, however, that the legislature should be precluded
from making this choice. Even in this situation-which will not always
exist-the legislature might be warranted in concluding that, despite
the regressive effect of the minimum wage, the gains to those who
benefit from it outweigh the harm to those who lose out. The legislature might decide, for example, that a minimum wage law is needed to
provide economic security to large numbers of working class families,
and that the burden on the less well-off people who will lose jobs is
worth the gain. Such a decision could certainly be questioned as a
matter of social policy, but it is not obvious that the value of freedom
of contract (even freedom to obtain a job) is great enough to justify
the courts in overturning this decision. Also, the legislature may be
able to provide benefits-such as cash or in-kind payments, or education and training-to those who lose their jobs because of the minimum wage. The Lochner-era Court was systematically unwilling to entertain this kind of defense of regulatory legislation.
Some restrictions on parties' ability to enter into contracts, then,
may serve the underlying values of freedom of contract; restrictions
that do impair freedom of contract may nonetheless be justified either
because they serve more important values or because the legislature
can provide substitutes. Obviously these are difficult and complex
questions. It is entirely possible that they are too difficult for courts to
sort out, and that in the end the only protection for freedom of contract will be provided by legislatures. But it is not wholly out of the
question that this right might be judicially enforceable. 7' The problem
46 See James J. Heckman and Hoult Verkerke, RacialDisparity and Economic Discrimination Law:An Economic Perspective,8 Yale L & Pol Rev 276,290 (1990).
47
For similar suggestions, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos,and Governance 50-80 (Yale
1997); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
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of enforcing freedom of speech might have seemed equally daunting
at one point: How can the courts possibly deal with all the varied
questions raised by laws that in some way limit speech? While of
course the courts' decisions in First Amendment cases can be criticized, few would say that they are, taken as a whole, the kind of disaster that the Lochner-era is generally thought to have been.
The question is not whether a court could, in one stroke, design a
comprehensive matrix that would determine the outcome of every
possible case involving restrictions on freedom of contract. Rather, it
is whether, proceeding case by case, but with a more complete understanding of the nature of freedom of contract and its limitations,
courts might design a workable doctrine. Some of the post-Lochner
cases that rejected freedom of contract claims might have been good
places to start because their outcomes seem nearly indefensible. The
laws involved in Williamson v Lee Optical Co" and Ferguson v

Skrupa,'9 for example, seem very hard to justify. Other decisions have
been persuasively attacked by commentators.' ° If some relatively easy
cases can be identified, then perhaps a workable legal regime could be
elaborated. But it would have to be built step by step, with careful attention to the competing demands and an understanding of when
freedom of contract could properly be limited or overridden.
The failings of the Lochner era may, in the end, have been more
quotidian than is generally supposed. The problem was not that the
Court misconceived the judicial role or did not understand how to interpret the Constitution. The justices' failure was in a sense a lack of
humility: an inability, or refusal, to understand that although they were
vindicating an important value, matters were more complicated than
they thought. There is a time for judicial crusades on behalf of principles of the highest importance; the Warren Court's campaign against
racial discrimination is an example. More often, though, judicial review requires courts to recognize the complexity of the issues they
confront and to develop doctrines that, while vindicating constitutional rights, also accommodate values that are in tension with those
rights. Lochner presented the latter, but the Court treated it as the
former, and that is why Lochner deserves the reputation it has today.
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